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Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and the Fifteenth Amendment: A
Constitutional Challenge to Post-Sentence Disenfranchisement
Reginald Thedford Jr.*

INTRODUCTION
Over six million American citizens were denied their right to vote in the 2016
election due to felony convictions.1 Notably, scholars, educators, and politicians
regardless of party affiliation have agreed that voting is one of the most important
rights a citizen has in a democratic nation.2 Felon disenfranchisement denies this
right to persons otherwise eligible to vote simply due to felony convictions, even after
they have served their sentences.3 This policy is extremely problematic for a country
that has a ninety-three percent conviction rate,4 during a time that has been labeled
the “Era of Mass Incarceration.”5 Additionally, according to the Department of
*
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A third-year law student at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, originally from St. Louis, Missouri.
Thanks to Asifa Quraishi-Landes, Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin, for the inspiration
and for thought provoking discussions on this issue, specifically with regard to Constitutional Law.
Also, thanks to Adam Stevenson, Clinical Associate Professor, for his insight on the operations of the
American criminal justice system.
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, RYAN LARSON & SARAH SHANNON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST
VOTERS: STATE LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016, at 3 (2016),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-estimates-felonydisenfranchisement-2016.
See, e.g., David Herbert Donald, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. & THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
OF 1965.NEW REPUBLIC(1978), https://newrepublic.com/article/72530/protest-selma-martin-luther-kingjr-the-voting-rights-act-1965-0 (last visited Dec 31, 2017) (“The vote is the most powerful instrument
ever devised by man for breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls which imprison men
because they are different from other men, declared President Lyndon B. Johnson when he signed the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.”); Joshua A. Douglas, The Foundational Importance of Voting: A Response to
Professor Flanders, 66 Okla. L. Rev. 81 (2013); Melody Wilkinson, Getting an Early Start-on Getting
Out the Vote, 63 Tex. B.J. 883 (2000) (“Officials including State Rep. Jerry Madden, Court of Appeals
Judge John Roach, Texas Supreme Court Justices Craig Enoch and Greg Abbott, and Court of Criminal
Appeals Judge Sharon Keller have all agreed to talk to students about the importance of exercising
their right to vote and the importance that responsibility plays in maintaining a strong democracy.”).
JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, Chapter Three: The Disenfranchised Population, in LOCKED OUT:
FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 70–71 (2006) (“What types of crimes result in a
felony conviction? In 2002, U.S. state and federal courts convicted over 1.1 million adults of felonies. . . .
Drug offenses make up almost one-third of the total. The next most common offenses are the property
crimes of larceny-theft, burglary, and fraud, each of which accounts for more than 9 percent of all felony
convictions. Finally, violent offenses make up about one in five felony convictions, with aggravated
assaults accounting for about half of all violent crimes. In many cases, the latter are simply fights that
get out of hand. The crimes of greatest public concern—murder, rape, and robbery—together made up
just 8 percent of all felony convictions.”).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012,
at 8 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2013/10/28/12statrpt.pdf.
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS, at
13 (2011) (“The term mass incarceration refers not only to the criminal justice system but also to the
larger web of laws, rules, policies, and customs that control those labeled criminals both in and out of
prison”).
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Justice, eighty percent of felony defendants in the seventy-five largest United States
counties were represented by public defenders or assigned counsel, and about threefourths of inmates in state prisons received publicly provided legal counsel,6 who are
overworked, underpaid, and under-resourced.7 Effectively, a system has been created
where primarily the impoverished are convicted ninety-three percent of the time.8
Moreover, these convictions are either through plea or trial, under advice from an
attorney that does not have the appropriate time and resources to effectively fight for
justice for their clients. What’s more startling is the fact that over fifty percent of the
people disenfranchised have completed their sentence and are no longer incarcerated,
on probation, or on parole.9 Currently, there are twelve states that restrict voting
rights to people who have completed their sentences;10 these individuals are
considered to be ex-felons. Former confederate states like Florida, Kentucky, and
6
7

8
9
10

STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
INDIGENT DEFENSE 1–3 (1996).
Alexa Van Brunt, PUBLIC DEFENDERS ARE OVERWORKED AND UNDERFUNDED. THAT MEANS MORE PEOPLE GO
TO JAILTHE GUARDIAN(2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/17/poor-rely-publicdefenders-too-overworked (last visited Dec 28, 2017) (“Too often, those who are poor receive lower
quality defense than those who have the means to pay”); See also, Joy, Peter A. Unequal Assistance of
Counsel.” Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy; Matt Ford, A 'CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS' IN MISSOURI
THE ATLANTIC (2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/missouri-public-defendercrisis/519444/ (last visited Dec 29, 2017).
Barnadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, PRISONS OF POVERTY: UNCOVERING THE PRE-INCARCERATION INCOMES
OF THE IMPRISONEDPRISON POLICY INITIATIVE(2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html
(last visited Dec 28, 2016)
UGGEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 6 (showing that, of the six million people that are disenfranchised, 26.5%
of those individuals are on probation or parole, while only 22.9% of those disenfranchised are in jail or
prison).
Id. at 4, nn.1–2, 4–5, 6–9 & 12–13.
Alabama – In 2016, legislation eased the rights restoration process after completion of
sentence for persons not convicted of a crime of “moral turpitude.”
Arizona – Permanently disenfranchises persons with two or more felony convictions. . . .
Delaware – The 2013 Hazel D. Plant Voter Restoration Act removed the five-year waiting
period. People convicted of a felony, with some exceptions, are now eligible to vote upon
completion of sentence and supervision. People who are convicted of certain disqualifying
felonies – including murder, bribery, and sexual offenses – are permanently disenfranchised.
Iowa – Governor Tom Vilsack restored voting rights to individuals who had completed their
sentences via executive order on July 4, 2005. Governor Terry Branstad reversed this
executive order on January 14, 2011 returning to permanent disenfranchisement for persons
released from supervision after that date. . . .
Nebraska – Reduced its indefinite ban on post-sentence voting to a two-year waiting period in
2005.
Nevada – Disenfranchises people convicted of one or more violent felonies and people
convicted of two or more felonies of any type.
Tennessee – Disenfranchises those convicted of certain felonies since 1981, in addition to
those convicted of select crimes prior to 1973. Others must apply to Board of Probation and
Parole for restoration. . . .
Virginia – When the Virginia Supreme Court overturned Governor Terry McAuliffe’s blanket
restoration of voting rights for people who had completed their sentences, he individually
approved voting rights for 12,832 individuals in August, 2016.
Wyoming – Voting rights restored after five years to people who complete sentences for firsttime, non-violent felony convictions in 2016 or after.
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Tennessee have the highest rates of disenfranchisement in the United States.11
Specifically, Florida accounts for nearly 1.5 million individuals disenfranchised postsentence, which accounts for about half of the national total.12
Race is also an important factor with regard to felon disenfranchisement.
Historically, confederate states created various schemes to keep black people
politically silent.13 Although courts have rejected the claim that felon
disenfranchisement is a racially discriminatory practice, African Americans continue
to be negatively impacted disproportionately compared to other races.14 According to
the Sentencing Project, one in thirteen African Americans of voting age is
disenfranchised, which is a rate four times greater than that of non-African
Americans.15
Many litigators have challenged the constitutionality of ex-felon
disenfranchisement under several theories. Primarily, ex-felon disenfranchisement
has been challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment16 as well as the Voting Rights
Act.17 Unfortunately, these challenges have not been successful.
In this Article, I will assert that ex-felon disenfranchisement is
unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, as well as aspects of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act. Specifically, the Fifteenth
Amendment states, “[T]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”18 I assert that the Fifteenth Amendment, by
explicitly prohibiting the denial of a citizen’s right to vote based on a “previous
condition of servitude,” read in tandem with the Thirteenth Amendment and the
Voting Rights Act, prohibits states from disenfranchising felons after they have
served their sentences.

11
12
13
14
15
16

17

18

Id. at 16.
Id. at 3.
See Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the
United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1059 (2002).
See Deborah Periman, Felon Disenfranchisement and the Voting Rights Act—Farrakhan v. Gregoire: “A
Crowd of One,” ALASKA JUST. F., Winter 2010, at 1–2.
UGGEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 12 (stating that over 7% of the African American population is
disenfranchised compared to 1.8% of the non-African American population).
See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding that respondents were not entitled to register
as voters under the Equal Protection Clause, since language in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
suggested that the practice of depriving felons of voting rights was acceptable, and because the practice
was historically viewed as valid).
See Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs bringing a section 2
Voting Rights Act challenge to felon disenfranchisement law based on the operation of a state’s
criminal justice system must at least show that the criminal justice system is infected by intentional
discrimination or that the felon disenfranchisement was enacted with such intent).
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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HISTORY OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT
A.

Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws

Disenfranchisement is not unique to the United States, nor did it originate in
this country. It was created by the Greeks and Romans, and was adopted in the
United States in the mid-eighteenth century.19 Historically, this medieval tradition
was referred to as a “civil death” because it entailed a deprivation of all rights.
Although ex-felons are not deprived of all their rights, permanent and post-sentence
disenfranchisement in a democratic nation runs akin to the idea of a “civil death”
because voting is the only way to ensure one’s voice is heard. A federal judge wrote
that:
[D]isenfranchisement is the harshest civil sanction
imposed by a democratic society. When brought beneath its
axe, the disenfranchised is severed from the body politic
and condemned to the lowest form of citizenship, where
voiceless at the ballot box . . . the disinherited must sit idly
by while others elect his civic leaders and while others
choose the fiscal and governmental policies which will
govern him and his family.20
As authors Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen highlighted in their book, Locked Out:
Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy, felon disenfranchisement has a
familial impact.21 Parents with felony convictions cannot vote on school referendums
that may potentially improve the neighborhood school district, nor do they get to vote
on taxes or how they are spent. 22 We must understand that felon disenfranchisement
impacts more than the individual deprived of the right.
When criminal disenfranchisement became adopted by colonial America, there
was a visible purpose.23 If a person committed a crime that was subject to the penalty
of disenfranchisement, that crime was “linked to voting itself” or was “defined as an
egregious violation of the moral code.”24 Nowadays, disenfranchisement laws are
applied, as collateral consequences, to broad categories of crimes with little or no
consistency in character.

19
20
21
22
23
24

Ewald, supra note 13, at 1059–60, 1063.
Id. at 1059 (quoting McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 971 (S.D. Miss. 1995)).
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 3, at 137.
Id.
Ewald, supra note 13, at 1062 (“Originally, the removal of criminals from the suffrage had a visible,
public dimension.”).
Id.
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Racial Motivation

Prior to the Civil War, blacks were not allowed to vote because, by law, they
were slaves. However, after the passage of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendment,
black men were emancipated and allowed to vote for the first time. As Professor Wang
of Indiana University of Pennsylvania stated, “By conferring on Black Americans the
right to vote, an essential right enabling a citizen to be politically accountable in a
democracy, the amendment redefined the meaning of American freedom and
democracy.”25 Unfortunately, this did not last long; whites wanted to maintain
supremacy. “After Reconstruction, several former confederate states carefully
rewrote their criminal disenfranchisement provisions with the express intent of
excluding blacks from the suffrage.”26 For example, some southern states barred from
voting anyone convicted of petty larceny, wife-beating, and similar offenses peculiar
to the low economic and social status of blacks at the time.27 Moreover, crimes such
as bigamy and vagrancy became offenses that led to disenfranchisement.28 Bigamy
and vagrancy were common among blacks, because many freed slaves became
dislocated after Reconstruction.29 In addition to racially discriminatory
disenfranchisement laws, a dominant group known as the Ku Klux Klan took many
actions to prevent blacks from voting. Former Senator and proud klansman, Theodore
Bilbo, once stated, “You and I know the best way to keep the nigger from voting. You
do it the night before the election.”30 It was apparent that white southerners did not
want blacks to have any political power; it is also important to note that this shows
how powerful voting was and remains in a democratic nation. Otherwise, why go
through such measures to restrict a specific group from exercising their citizenship
rights? Although the explicit racism of the Reconstruction Era doesn’t exist today,
African Americans are still disproportionately impacted by disenfranchisement over
any other race.31 Felon disenfranchisement is a big part of that. In other words, felon
disenfranchisement effectively operates in a racist manner.
C.

Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement Justifications

Common reasons for disenfranchising felons include promoting civic
responsibility and respect for the law (felons have violated the social contract),
controlling crime, and keeping the ballot box pure, as well as reacting to fears of voter

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 1860-1870, 17 CARDOZO L. REV.
2153, 2153 (1995).
Ewald, supra note 13, at 1065.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
Id. at 1092 n.197 (noting that the sale of slaves had broken up many marriages, and that blacks often
remarried without obtaining a divorce or confirming the death of a former spouse).
Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC, June 2014, at 56 (quoting Theodore Bilbo),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631.
Ewald, supra note 13.
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fraud and subversive voting.32 Subversive voting is the idea that convicts will
presumably vote in a way that is “subversive of the interests of an orderly society,”
which is derived from the liberal idea that voters only vote to protect their own
interests.33 It has been noted that prominent supporters of indefinite
disenfranchisement today place heavy emphasis on subversive voting hypotheses.34
In 1999, the Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act was introduced in
Congress.35 The primary goal of this bill was to secure the federal voting rights of
persons who have been released from prison. Unfortunately, this bill was not enacted,
but it is important to note the rationales for why it did not receive full support. During
the hearing, Roger Clegg, Vice President and General Counsel for the Center for
Equal Opportunity, stated his concern with allowing ex-felons to vote. He stated, “We
want people to vote only if they are trustworthy and only if they are loyal.”36 He went
on to assert that “[i]t is not unreasonable to suppose that people who have committed
serious crimes are lacking in trustworthiness and are not going to be good citizens.”37
Clegg even then dismissed the disproportionate racial impact of these laws:
The fact that criminals are “overrepresented” in some
groups and “underrepresented” in other groups is no
reason for the federal government to intervene, absent
some evidence of discriminatory intent by the states. If a
lot of young people, black people, or male people are
committing crimes, then our efforts should be focused on
solving that problem. It is bizarre instead to increase their
political power.38
Additionally, Todd F. Gaziano of the Heritage Foundation told Congress during this
hearing that allowing ex-convicts to vote “could have a perverse effect on the ability
of law abiding citizens to reduce the deadly and debilitating crime in their
communities.”39
Also, a notable case for supporters of ex-felon disenfranchisement is U.S.
Supreme Court case, Richardson v. Ramirez.40 In this case, three ex-felons who
completed their prison and parole sentences challenged provisions of the California
State Constitution that permanently disenfranchised convicted felons, claiming that
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Mandeep K. Dhami & Paula A. Cruise, Prisoner Disenfranchisement: Prisoner and Public Views of an
Invisible Punishment, 13 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 211, 213 (2013).
Ewald, supra note 13, at 1079.
Id. at 1080.
Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/hr906.
Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 106th Cong. 15 (1999) (statement of Roger Clegg,
Vice President and General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 44.
418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.41 The
California Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs and ordered the County Clerk to
register them as voters. However, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned this decision,
based on another section of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians
not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive
and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.43
The Court concluded that a citizen’s right to vote may be taken away as a result of
“participat[ing] in rebellion, or other crime,”44 reasoning that this applied to all
felonies.45 Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that this section provided “an
affirmative sanction” for felon disenfranchisement laws.46
I, along with other scholars, believe that Rehnquist erred in his interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment in this case.47 The Fourteenth Amendment was passed
during the Reconstruction Era, a time when many aggressive amendments were
made to the U.S. Constitution in order to restructure the remnants of slavery in the
legal, political, and economic systems in the states that attempted to secede from the
Union. Understanding this historical context is very important to understanding
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Legal scholar, Jason Morgan-Foster
explains:
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 54, 56.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2 (emphasis added).
Id.
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
Id.
See, e.g., Richard W. Bourne, Richardson v. Ramirez: A Motion to Reconsider, 42 VAL. U.L. REV. 1, 1
(2007); William J. Lee, Book Review, 54 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1064, 1068 (1968) (reviewing THE VA. COMM’N
ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOV’T, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS (Alfred Avins, ed.,
1967)); William W. Liles, Comment, Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws: Past, Present, and
Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615 (2007).
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[W]hile the Ramirez Court believed that the words “or
other crime” emerged mysteriously from the black box of
congressional committee, a review of the legislative history
shows they were actually contemplated in open session
before entering committee. This is significant, because the
whole text of the plenary discussions has been preserved,
whereas the Committee discussions have not. Examining
these plenary discussions, it is clear that the words “or
other crime,” when taken in their proper context, were
meant to refer to crimes of rebellion and disloyalty,
particularly treason.48
Morgan-Foster argues that the Republicans were focused on disenfranchising
Confederate leaders rather than felons of all kinds.49
On the other hand, if we do accept that the Fourteenth Amendment is an
affirmative sanction for felon disenfranchisement, we must still consider the text of
the Fifteenth Amendment. The text protects the voting rights of people that were
previously in a condition of servitude. Therefore, with regard to post-sentence
disenfranchisement, we must defer to the text of the Fifteenth Amendment.
D.

Counter-Arguments to Felon Disenfranchisement Justifications

There are three things wrong with Clegg’s and Gaziano’s argument. First,
neither Clegg nor Gaziano offer any evidence to show that ex-felons are more likely
to commit voter fraud than any other person.50 The assumption seems misplaced,
given that almost all offenders “incapacitated” at the ballot box are convicted of nonelectoral crimes.51 Second, one of the purposes of incarceration is rehabilitation.
Specifically, the Federal Bureau of Prisons has declared that its vision has been
realized when inmates successfully reenter society.52 So, if one of the purposes of our

48
49
50

51
52

Jason Morgan-Foster, Transnational Judicial Discourse and Felon Disenfranchisement: Re-Examining
Richardson v. Ramirez, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 279, 285, 288 (2006).
See id. at 291.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 79–81 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In contrast, many of those convicted of
violating election laws are treated as misdemeanants and are not barred from voting at all. . . .
Moreover, there are means available for the State to prevent voting fraud which are far less
burdensome on the constitutionally protected right to vote. As we said in Dunn, supra, at 353, the State
‘has at its disposal a variety of criminal laws that are more than adequate to detect and deter whatever
fraud may be feared.’ . . . Given the panoply of criminal offenses available to deter and to punish
electoral misconduct, as well as the statutory reforms and technological changes which have
transformed the electoral process in the last century, election fraud may no longer be a serious
danger.”).
Ewald, supra note 13, at 1106.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, BOP: AGENCY PILLARS, https://www.bop.gov/about/agency/agency_pillars.jsp
(last visited Dec 31, 2017).
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criminal justice system is to rehabilitate,53 then why is there an assumption that
upon finishing their sentence, felons will not be law-abiding citizens? Either our
justice system is failing at this purpose, or there is an underlying political agenda in
disenfranchising ex-felons. Although some may observe our prison system as a
mechanism to punish criminals rather than rehabilitate them, there are many
studies and scholars that suggest rehabilitation should be the primary focus of our
criminal justice system.54 Third, to acknowledge that black people are
overrepresented in the criminal justice system, and then conclude that it’s “bizarre”
to increase black political power is the backwards political thinking that perpetuates
racial inequality. Also, to say that black people, young people, or male people commit
more crimes than any other group, completely disregards how the criminal justice
system operates. There are numerous studies to show that black criminality does not
explain their disproportionately high numbers in the criminal justice system.55
Rather, the disparate targeting by law enforcement and disparate treatment in the
system are the significant causes.56 Studies have repeatedly shown that blacks are
more likely than others to be arrested for nearly every crime. As the FBI reported,
“Nationwide, black people are arrested at higher rates for crimes as serious as murder
and assault, and as minor as loitering and marijuana possession.” 57 This is startling
53

54

55
56

57

Rehabilitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“1. Criminal law. The process of seeking to
improve a criminal's character and outlook so that he or she can function in society without committing
other crimes <rehabilitation is a traditional theory of criminal punishment, along with deterrence and
retribution>.”).
Etienne Benson, Rehabilitate or Punish?, 34 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 46 (2003),
www.apa.org/monitor/julaug03/rehab.aspx (citing Craig Haney, PhD, psychologist at the University of
California, Santa Cruz) (“Until the mid-1970s, rehabilitation was a key part of U.S. prison policy.
Prisoners were encouraged to develop occupational skills and to resolve psychological problems—such
as substance abuse or aggression—that might interfere with their reintegration into society. Indeed,
many inmates received court sentences that mandated treatment for such problems. Since then,
however, rehabilitation has taken a back seat to a ‘get tough on crime’ approach that sees punishment
as prison's main function, says Haney. The approach has created explosive growth in the prison
population, while having at most a modest effect on crime rates. . . . In the 1970s, when major changes
were being made to the U.S. prison system, psychologists had little hard data to contribute. But in the
past 25 years, says Haney, they have generated a massive literature documenting the importance of
child abuse, poverty, early exposure to substance abuse and other risk factors for criminal behavior.
The findings suggest that individual-centered approaches to crime prevention need to be complemented
by community-based approaches. Researchers have also found that the pessimistic ‘nothing works’
attitude toward rehabilitation that helped justify punitive prison policies in the 1970s was overstated.
When properly implemented, work programs, education and psychotherapy can ease prisoners’
transitions to the free world.”).
Ewald, supra note 13, at 1125.
Id. at 1126. (“The U.S. Government ‘estimates that 14% of illegal drug users are black, yet blacks make
up 55% of those convicted and 74% of those sentenced for drug possession.’ The U.S. Sentencing
Commission estimates that 65% of crack cocaine users are white, but 90% of those prosecuted for crack
crimes in federal court are black—and are subject to greater penalties than are those convicted of
crimes involving cocaine in the powder form.”).
Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates: ‘Staggering Disparity,’ USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2014 5:13
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/18/ferguson-black-arrest-rates/19043207
(“To measure the breadth of arrest disparities, USA TODAY examined data that police departments
report to the FBI each year. For each agency, USA TODAY compared the number of black people
arrested during 2011 and 2012 with the number who lived in the area the department protects. (The
FBI tracks arrests by race; it does not track arrests of Hispanics.)”).
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information, but according to American history, these effects are parallel to custom
and tradition. American history shows us that African Americans have always been
subject to an unreasonable amount of policing. In the legendary Dred Scott case,
Judge Taney unapologetically declared that blacks are an inferior race; Taney’s
holding sheds light on how blacks were viewed at the time, and how they should be
viewed in the future.58 Taney ultimately held that Dred Scott could not obtain
citizenship, not only because he was a slave, but because he was black.59 He used
state legislation to justify his decision; primarily leaning on racist state laws to justify
his opinion that blacks are inferior. For slave states, he stated that:
They have continued to treat them as an inferior class, and
to subject them to strict police regulations, drawing a broad
line of distinction between the citizens and the slave races
. . . . [I]t is too plain for argument, that they have never
been regarded as a part of the people or citizens of the
State, nor supposed to possess any political rights which
the dominant race might not withhold or grant at their
pleasure.60
Additionally, he discusses the racist treatment of blacks who were freemen.
Judge Taney stated, “And if we turn to the legislation of the States where slavery had
worn out, or measures taken for its speedy abolition, we shall find the same opinions
and principles equally fixed and equally acted upon.”61 Although this case was
overturned by the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not overturn the
opinions and attitudes towards blacks. Unfortunately, these opinions towards black
people have not been eliminated in this country, which is a big reason why the black
community continues to suffer. However, it is more alarming to see that this attitude
continues to be adopted by many liberals and moderates over one-hundred years
later, whether subconsciously or consciously. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. warned us
of this type of political thought in his Letter from Birmingham Jail:
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Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 403 (1857).
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403 (“The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported
into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought
into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all rights, and
privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen?”), see also PAUL BREST,
SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR & REVA B. SIEGEL., PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 268–84 (6th ed. 2015).
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 412.
Id. at 413 (“[W]e find that in the same statute passed in 1774, which prohibited the further importation
of slaves into the State, there is also a provision by which any negro, Indian, or mulatto servant, who
was found wandering out of the town or place to which he belonged, without a written pass such as is
therein described, was made liable to be seized by any one, and taken before the next authority to be
examined and delivered up to his master—who was required to pay the charge which had accrued
thereby. And a subsequent section of the same law provides, that if any free negro shall travel without
such pass, and shall be stopped, seized, or taken up, he shall pay all charges arising thereby. . . . So
that up to that time free negroes and mulattoes were associated with servants and slaves in the police
regulations established by the laws of the State.”) (emphasis added); see also PAUL BREST ET AL., supra
note 59, at 275–76.
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I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the
Negro’s great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom
is not the White Citizen’s Counciler or the Ku Klux
Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to
“order” than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which
is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the
presence of justice; who constantly says: “I agree with you
in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods
of direct action;” who paternalistically believes he can set
the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a
mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the
Negro to wait for a “more convenient season.” Shallow
understanding from people of good will is more frustrating
than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will.62
Dr. King first addressed the terrorism blacks faced from groups like the KKK,
but he was more disappointed in the “white silence,” which is primarily from a
shallow understanding of the black community.63 It cannot be ignored that from the
onset of this country, the black community has always been subject to political
control. As stated earlier, a democratic nation prides itself on being a government for
the people–a government where each individual voice is heard through a vote. Postsentence disenfranchisement guts that democratic concept.
Additionally, the idea that states will decide whether someone will obtain their
right to vote, post-sentence, is completely paternalistic. As Coretta Scott King stated,
“[F]reedom and justice cannot be parceled out in pieces to suit political convenience.
. . . I don’t believe you can stand for freedom for one group of people and deny it to
others.” 64 Voting is that mechanism towards freedom, and to deny it is to halt
freedom. We are basking in ignorance if we agree with Clegg and think that the right
to vote will not help resolve the crime in certain areas. As we know, our right to vote
is powerful. We vote on school referendums that impact neighborhood schools, which
can be used to improve school districts; we vote on state representatives that write
legislation and advocate on behalf of their constituents; and we vote on state officials
that directly impact their constituents’ way of life. As Martin Luther King said:
So long as I do not firmly and irrevocably possess the right
to vote I do not possess myself. I cannot make up my
mind—it is made up for me. I cannot live as a democratic
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MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL 3 (1963).
See id.
Press Conference on the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, Washington D.C. (June 23,
1994).
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citizen, observing the laws I have helped to enact—I can
only submit to the edict of others.65
Clegg’s suggestion that giving an oppressed group political power is “bizarre,” is to
continue the oppression. The denial of political power in a democratic society is
counterproductive to a good democracy.
It is important to address and acknowledge that there are people who do not
align with this type of thought. Judge Friendly, the well-known Judge, wrote:
[I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to
decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take
part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the
executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try
them for further violations, or the judges who are to
consider their cases.66
However, this logic seems judgmental and oppressive. People that have been under
the control of the criminal justice system have a good understanding as to how it
operates. They see firsthand how judges and prosecutors conduct themselves in the
courtroom, they see how the laws impact their life post sentence (such as collateral
consequences), but most importantly, they see the fallacies of the system. Essentially,
the individuals that understand how government operates are the people that need
to be at the polls.
E.

Importance of Legal History

Understanding our history is key to developing a better future. Edmund Burke
stated, “[T]hose who don’t know history are destined to repeat it.” Unfortunately, our
understanding of race relations in America is miniscule. It is undisputed that
historically, the black community has been the target of domestic terrorism,67
political exploitation, and social exclusion. However, even looking at our current
society, much of the black community continues to be confronted with the same
systematic obstacles more than any other group: poor education systems,
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system, and the inability to participate in
the political process. This is why it is important to not only understand history but
legal history. Professor Phillips68 delivered the Salmond Lecture in 2010 at the
Victoria University of Wellington Law, where he presented on the importance of legal
history.69 In his lecture he stated:
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I will organise my remarks around what I see as four
principal reasons why legal history especially matters:
that legal history teaches us about the contingency of law,
about its fundamental shaping by other historical forces;
that legal history shows us that the while law is shaped
by other forces, it can be at the same time relatively
autonomous, not always the handmaiden of dominant
interests; that legal history, perhaps paradoxically, frees
us from the past, allows us to make our own decisions by
seeing that there is nothing inevitable or preordained in
what we currently have; and that legal history exposes the
presence of many variants of legal pluralism in both the
past and the present.70
This lecture elaborated on one of Phillips’ principles, legal history can paradoxically
free us from the past. It must be noted that the words of judges, such as Judge Taney
and Judge Friendly, remain influential today. These were prestigious judges and
their opinions have impacted the modern legal society more than we think. People of
color, especially Black Americans, are over-policed, overrepresented in jails and
prisons, and underrepresented in the political process. We must reconcile our legal
history to understand the current status of people of color in America, and to move in
a more liberating direction.
II.

THE THIRTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS & VOTING RIGHTS ACT
A.

Felon Status as Servitude

In 1965 a former inmate, Sam DeStefano, challenged the Illinois state law that
governed the restoration of rights to citizens who were convicted of certain crimes.71
DeStefano primarily argued under the Fourteenth Amendment, but he also argued
that the Fifteenth Amendment protected his right to vote because he had previously
been in a condition of servitude since he was incarcerated.72 However, the court used
case law to indicate that they may use various factors, such as a criminal record, to
determine the qualification of voters.73 The court also stated that “The Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments were written into the Constitution to insure to the Negro,
who had recently been liberated from slavery, the equal protection of the laws and
the right to full participation in the process of government.”74 The court quickly
addressed DeStefano’s Fifteenth Amendment argument, thus not going into an in70
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Id. at 294–95.
People v. DeStefano, 212 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 362 (quoting Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948)).
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depth analysis. Ultimately, the court dismissed DeStefano’s Fifteenth Amendment
argument.75 DeStefano and I have similar arguments; however, I distinguish mine
by only including ex-felons who have finished their sentence as a protected class
under the Fifteenth Amendment. Therefore, we must address and acknowledge the
condition of servitude all felons are in, and not just the felons incarcerated.
Felons are individuals that have been convicted of a felony.76 When someone is
convicted of a felony they are sentenced to either imprisonment or probation and then
possibly put on probation and/or parole after being released from prison. These are
all conditions subject to the state’s control, which is important to note because this
ultimately means that these individuals are in a condition of servitude.
In 2014, it was estimated that over four million adults were under community
supervision, which includes people on probation, parole, or any other post-prison
supervision.77 Felons on parole or probation are effectively slaves to the state.
Parolees and probationers are restricted from leaving certain geographical locations;
they are required to meet with their designated officer whenever the state says so;
their house, car, and body is subject to being searched, without a warrant, at any
given moment; and they are required to pay supervision fees.78 Essentially, felons
lack the liberty to determine their way of life, which is consistent with the definition
of servitude. Servitude is defined as “[a] condition in which a person lacks liberty
especially to determine one’s course of action or way of life – slavery – the state of
being subject to a master.” 79
Moreover, the way felons are controlled runs akin to how pre-Civil War slaves
were controlled. Historically, slaves were not allowed to leave the plantation without
the permission of the master;80 they were required to answer to the demands of the
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Felon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
DANIELLE KAEBLE, LAURA MARUSCHAK & THOMAS BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014, at 1 (Lynne McConnell & Jill Thomas
eds., 2015).
See e.g., REBEKAH DILLER, JUDITH GREENE & MICHELLE JACOBS, MARYLAND'S PAROLE SUPERVISION FEE: A
BARRIER TO REENTRY MARYLAND'S PAROLE SUPERVISION FEE: A BARRIER TO REENTRY1–42 (2009); DOC
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United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 972 (1998); see also 2-47A MODERN FEDERAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS–CRIMINAL ¶ 47A.01, Instruction 47A-3 (LEONARD SAND, JOHN S. SIFFERT, WALTER P.
LOUGHLIN, STEVEN A. REISS & NANCY BATTERMAN 2017) (citing Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 968–69).
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master or overseer,81 and the slave quarters82 were subject to searches at any time.83
Essentially, the designation of “felon” is the new designation of a slave.
B.

Fifteenth Amendment and Servitude

The Fifteenth Amendment states that, “[t]he right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”84 Unfortunately, there is no
Supreme Court interpretation on what “previous condition of servitude” means;
however, the U.S. Supreme Court has defined the term involuntary servitude as it
relates to the Thirteenth Amendment,85 which was ratified only five years before the
Fifteenth Amendment. This is important to note for intertextuality purposes. In
United States v. Kozminski, the Court defined the term “involuntary servitude.”86
Notably, in doing so, the Kozmiski Court’s jury instructions separate both words,
“involuntary” and “servitude,” and define each one separately.87 Accordingly, the
Court defined servitude as, “‘[a] condition in which a person lacks liberty, especially
to determine one’s course of action or way of life’ – ‘slavery’ – ‘the state of being subject
to a master.’”88 Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines servitude as “the condition
of being a servant or slave.”89 As a result of these definitions, I assert that felons are
in a condition of servitude for the reasons in section A. So, if we read the Fifteenth
Amendment, in light of the Court’s definition of servitude, it could be understood that
the U.S. Constitution prohibits disenfranchising ex-felons.
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See id. (“By law, slaves were the personal property of their owners in all Southern states except
Louisiana. The slave master held absolute authority over his human property as the Louisiana law
made clear: ‘The master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry, and his labor; [the slave] can
do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire anything but what must belong to his master.’”).
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shelters were cold in winter, hot in summer, and leaky when it rained.”).
Id. (“The lives of black people under slavery in the South were controlled by a web of customs, rules,
and laws known as ‘slave codes.’ Slaves could not travel without a written pass. They were forbidden to
learn how to read and write. They could be searched at any time. They could not buy or sell things
without a permit. They could not own livestock. They were subject to a curfew every night.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 971–72.
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Instruction 47A-3.
Servitude, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
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Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce this
Amendment.90 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) became that mechanism for
enforcement, and its primary purpose was to eliminate the state and local barriers
preventing African Americans from exercising their right to vote under the Fifteenth
Amendment. Effectively, the VRA banned literacy tests, provided federal oversight of
state and local registration areas, and authorized the U.S. Attorney General to bring
suit to bar the use of poll taxes in state and local elections.91 This was a powerful
victory for African Americans because they would finally get a chance to exercise their
right to vote without being intimidated. Although this was a huge step toward civil
rights, the VRA only provided relief from voting restrictions when they were enacted
with discriminatory intent, which is a high standard to meet.92 “But in 1982, Congress
amended the VRA to relieve plaintiffs of the burden of proving discriminatory
intent.”93 Subsequently, the requirement to prove discrimination in voter restricting
laws for a protected class of citizens was based on the “totality of circumstances.”94
Farrakhan I95 and Farrakhan II96 are two notable cases that discuss the
“totality of circumstances” amendment, with regard to felon disenfranchisement. In
Farrakhan I, incarcerated individuals in the state of Washington sued state officials
under the VRA, claiming the state’s felon disenfranchisement scheme was racially
motivated, which violates the VRA.97 The plaintiffs argued that the state’s criminal
justice system disproportionately impacted African Americans, Hispanics, and
Native Americans, which hindered their ability to participate in the political
process.98 In part, Farrakhan I held that in order to bring a section 2 VRA challenge
to felon disenfranchisement, the plaintiff must show that, based on the totality of
circumstances, the challenged voting practice results in discrimination on account of
race. 99 Subsequently, the court considered evidence of racial discrimination in
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Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003).
Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2010).
Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1011.
Id. at 1011.
Id. at 1014–16 (“The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments identified ‘typical factors’ that
may be relevant in analyzing whether Section 2 has been violated:
(1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched
the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or other-wise to participate in the
democratic process;
(2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
(3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts,
majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
(4) if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied
access to that process;
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Washington’s criminal justice system.100 The Farrakhan I decision isolated the Ninth
Circuit on this issue.101 Effectively, it produced a circuit split on the particular issue
of whether evidence of a criminal justice system engaged in discriminatory practices
may be used to challenge felony disenfranchisement under section 2 of the VRA.102
However, the court in Farrakhan II reasoned that felon disenfranchisement takes
place after conviction, which is determined by the criminal justice system that has its
own safeguards and procedures.103 Therefore, Farrakhan II ultimately held “that
plaintiffs bringing a section 2 VRA challenge to a felon disenfranchisement law based
on the operation of a state’s criminal justice system must at least show that the
criminal justice system is infected by intentional discrimination or that the felon
disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent.” 104 Basically, the court
distinguished intent to discriminate with regard to felon disenfranchisement, from
intent to discriminate within the criminal justice system.
Although the VRA and the courts in Farrakhan I & II center their discussion
and analysis on race, it was based on the fact that race is a constitutionally protected
class under the Fifteenth Amendment, with regard to voter discrimination. As stated
earlier, the spirit of the VRA was to ensure voters within the protected classes, under
the Fifteenth Amendment, were able to vote. Those protected classes include not just
race and color but also “previous condition of servitude.”105
Notably, in Mobile v. Bolden, the Supreme Court states that, according to
legislative history, section 2 of VRA “makes clear that it was intended to have an
effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment.”106 Even though these cases
specifically discuss racially discriminatory acts, they make it clear that the VRA
works in tandem with the Fifteenth Amendment, which protects people from being
discriminated against based on their race, color, or previous condition of servitude. As
asserted above, felons are subject to the control of the state. Permanent and postsentence disenfranchisement based on someone’s designation as a “felon”
discriminates against a class of people protected by the Fifteenth Amendment,
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especially when there’s no justification for the disenfranchisement other than the fact
they have been convicted of a felony.
III.

CONCLUSION

The text of the Fifteenth Amendment makes it clear that a citizen’s right to
vote cannot be denied for previously being in a condition of servitude. Conclusively, I
have asserted that felons are in a condition of servitude; and ex-felons, who have
finished their term(s) of ‘servitude’, are protected under the Fifteenth Amendment.
Under this theory, a little over half of the disenfranchised population will be eligible
to vote.107 Enfranchising ex-felons would be a great step toward improving our
democracy because currently, not only are these perspectives silenced, but those that
are disenfranchised do not even have a say in the laws that govern their families.
They do not have the right to vote on school referendums that will affect their
children, nor do they have a say in how their taxes will be used, which are not optional
to pay.108
Additionally, criminal disenfranchisement exists at the intersection of two
systems; electoral politics and criminal justice, which have been explicitly
discriminatory for much of American history.109 The 1982 VRA amendments declared
that discriminatory challenges under this act be proven under the totality of
circumstances test. Thus, we must not ignore the disparate impact of arrest rates and
disenfranchisement on African Americans. We must also not ignore the historical fact
that many states used various schemes to disenfranchise blacks, post Reconstruction.
The spirit of the Fifteenth Amendment was to give newly freed slaves the right to
vote. Although there’s no Supreme Court interpretation on what “previous condition
of servitude” means, we do know that prior to the Civil War free blacks were sold into
terms of “servitude” for petty crimes.110 Basically, the effects of disenfranchisement
and the criminal justice system reflect the racist practices against blacks that have
been present for much of American history.
Furthermore, although felons on probation or parole live in society, they are
subject to the control of the government. They cannot leave a certain geographical
area without the permission of the government; they must report to their parole or
probation officer whenever the government requires them to; and they are subject to
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searches at any time, whether it is the home, car, or person. This is the type of control
consistent with the definition of servitude, and the Constitution prohibits
disenfranchisement as a result of previous servitude.
The text of the Fifteenth Amendment is clear; no state shall deprive any citizen
of their right to vote based on previously being in a condition of servitude. Originalists
may argue that the word “servitude” means chattel slavery, but history and the text
counter this interpretation.111 During the Reconstruction Era, there was much debate
on black suffrage.112 Subsequently, this led to the Fifteenth Amendment, but there
were many proposals before the final draft was approved. George S. Boutwell
submitted one of those proposals and it stated that, “[t]he right of any citizen of the
United States to vote . . . shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any
State by reason of race, color, or previous condition of slavery.” 113 The language,
“slavery,” was proposed but was not used for the final version. Therefore, we must
look at the actual text, which uses “servitude.” Felons are in a condition of servitude;
thus, ex-felons, who have completed their term(s) of servitude, are protected by the
Fifteenth Amendment.
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